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LEGAL LIMITS OF A HANDGUN
MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY FOR
THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF THIRD
PERSONS
Richman v. Charter Arms Corp.'
No court or jury has held a handgun manufacturer liable for the wrongful
death of a murder victim killed by a handgun. In fact, until recently, no court
had recognized that such a claim was actionable. In Richman v. Charter Arms
Corp., the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
concluded that marketing handguns for sale to the general public may be an
"ultrahazardous activity" subjecting the manufacturer to absolute liability for
the harm the gun causes.2 The court's decison was a major victory for plain-
tiffs' lawyers and gun control advocates, who launched a concerted judicial
attack against handgun manufacturers in 1980.1
The case was triggered by the criminal acts of Willie Watson, who, on
April 4, 1981, obtained a handgun from an acquaintance. Later that evening,
Watson abducted third year medical student Kathy Newman at gunpoint as
she arrived at her apartment in a residential area of New Orleans. Watson
forced Newman to drive to a secluded area, where he robbed and raped her.
Watson then told Newman to dress herself, and as she did so, shot her in the
back of the head, fearing that she would identify him." The murder weapon
was a "snub nose .38" designed, manufactured, and marketed by Charter
Arms Corporation.5
Watson was tried, convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to
death.' Rather than seek civil redress from Watson, Judie Richman, the vic-
1. 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983).
2. Id. at 204.
3. See S. SPEISER, LAWSUIT 369 (1980); Podgers, Tort Lawyers Take Aim at
Handguns, BRIEF, Nov. 1981, at 4; Weiss, Guns in the Courts, ATLANTIC, May 1983,
at 9; Taking Aim at Handguns, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2, 1982, at 42; Speiser, Disarming
the Handgun Problem By Directly Suing Arms Makers, Nat'l L.J., June 8, 1981, at
29, col. 1; Suits Target Handgun Makers, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 29, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
4. 571 F. Supp. at 193; State v. Watson, 423 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (La. 1982).
Most of the facts were taken from Watson's confession. Id. at n.1.
5. 571 F. Supp. at 193-94. For purposes of a summary judgment motion, the
court assumed that Charter Arms had designed, manufactured, and marketed the mur-
der weapon. Id. at 194 & n.2.
6. Id. at 193. On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
but reversed the death sentence and remanded for a new sentence hearing. 423 So. 2d
at 1132.
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tim's mother, filed a diversity action7 for wrongful death against Charter
Arms. Richman contended that Charter Arms was liable for the death of her
daughter because it designed, manufactured, and made the murder weapon
available for sale to the general public and because a foreseeable consequence
of doing so was the loss of human life.8
Charter Arms moved for summary judgment on the ground that Louisi-
ana law prohibits courts from imposing liability on handgun manufacturers for
injuries resulting from the criminal misuse of their products. 9 In ruling on the
motion, the court concluded that Richman could not prevail under Louisiana
products liability law. Summary judgment was denied, however, as to Rich-
man's ultrahazardous activity theory. The court held that Charter Arms' mar-
keting practices may be an ultrahazardous activity.'"
Both the products liability and ultrahazardous activity theories of recov-
ery are novel in their application to a handgun manufacturer's liability for the
criminal acts of third parties. As between the two theories, lawyers and com-
mentators have targeted the products liabilty approach as the primary vehicle
for recovery against handgun manufacturers." This approach imposes liability
for defective products. 12 Most jurisdictions require that the defect be unrea-
sonably dangerous." Three categories of defects have been recognized: manu-
7. The substantive law to be applied in Richman was the law of Louisiana. See
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
8. 571 F. Supp. at 194.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 208.
11. See generally Fisher, Are Handgun Manufacturers Strictly Liable in Tort?,
56 CAL. ST. B.J. 16 (1981); Turley, Manufacturers' and Suppliers' Liability to Hand-
gun Victims, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 41 (1982); Note, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims
of Handgun Crime: A Common-Law Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 771 (1983);
Note, Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Injuries from a Well-Made Handgun, 24
WM. & MARY L. REV. 467 (1983).
12. Wade, On Product "'Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 551, 551 (1980).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), provides that "[o]ne
who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous. . . is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer. .. "
Some states have codified a definition of strict products liability that is virtually the
same as section 402A. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6 (1977). In other states,
courts have imposed the unreasonably dangerous qualification. See, e.g., Potthoff v.
Alms, 41 Colo. App. 51, -, 583 P.2d 309, 310-11 (1978) (requirement that alleged
defects rendered earth moving machine unreasonably dangerous); Heldt v. Nicholson
Mfg. Co., 72 Wis. 2d 110, 115, 240 N.W.2d 154, 157 (1976) (the "unreasonably dan-
gerous" element remains an essential ingredient of a strict liability action). Not all
courts require that a defective product be unreasonably dangerous. For instance, in
1972, the Supreme Court of California rejected the unreasonably dangerous standard
because it "rings of negligence" and declared that the plaintiff need only show that the
product was "defective." Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132-33, 135, 501
P.2d 1153, 1162-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442-43 (1972). However, the same court later
reintroduced a risk-utility balancing test in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,
573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). See infra notes 27, 31 and accompanying
19841
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facturing, design, and marketing. 4 Manufacturing defects are unreasonably
dangerous when an individual product within a product line is improperly as-
sembled.' 5 Design defects make an entire product line or a component part
thereof unreasonably dangerous or unsafe.' 6 Finally, marketing defects render
a product unreasonably dangerous when the manufacturer fails to provide ade-
quate warnings and instructions necessary for the product's safe use. 17
Defects in manufacturing and design have traditionally afforded recovery
against firearms manufacturers.' 8 Anti-handgun litigants contend that liability
should be imposed even for handguns that are flawlessly manufactured and
contain no hidden design defects.' 9 Short barreled, "snub-nosed" handguns are
easily concealed and are designed, manufactured, and distributed principally
for shooting individuals. These guns are not sufficiently accurate or reliable for
purposes of self-defense, sporting activities, or military and police functions
and are the preferred weapons of criminals.2" The extreme danger inherent in
handgun design, coupled with the indiscriminate marketing of a small conceal-
able handgun to the general public, renders a handgun defective and unrea-
sonably dangerous.2'
Courts have applied two tests2' to the unreasonably dangerous qualifica-
text; see also Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 411, 413, 579 P.2d 1287, 1287-
88 (1978) (plaintiff must show that the product was dangerously defective).
14. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[4][fJ[i]
(1982).
15. E.g., Roy Matson Truck Lines v. Michelin Tire Corp., 277 N.W.2d 361
(Minn. 1979) (plaintiff alleged blowout caused by bonding defect in tire); see also 2 L.
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, § 16A[4][f][iii].
16. E.g., Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 77 Ill. 2d 434, 437, 396 N.E.2d 534,
535-36 (1979) (plaintiff alleged defective design due to absence of protective "head-
shield" on tank car); see also 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, §
16A[4] [][iv].
17. E.g., Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, 87 N.J. 229, 242-43, 432 A.2d 925,
932 (1981) ("inadequate warning case must focus on safety and emphasize that a man-
ufacturer . . . has not satisfied its duty to warn, even if the product is perfectly in-
spected, designed, and manufactured"); see also 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 14, § 16A[4][f][vi].
18. See, e.g., Cobb v. Insured Lloyds, 387 So. 2d 13, 18-19 (La. Ct. App, 1980)
(manufacturer liable on finding design defect in single-action revolver, which acciden-
tally discharged while fully loaded and in full forward position), cert. denied, 394 So.
2d 615 (La. 1980); Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151, 155 (La, Ct. App.
1979) (malfunction of safety on gun was a result of defect in design and manufacture),
afl'd on rehearing, 395 So. 2d 310 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
"19. Fisher, supra note 11, at 16; Podgers, supra note 3, at 5; Speiser, supra
note 3, at 29.
20. Turley, supra note 11, at 59-62.
21. See Fisher, supra note 11, at 17; Turley, supra note 11, at 49.
22. Several scholarly works have analyzed and proposed various tests for design
defects. E.g. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 602-49 (1980);
Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 348-52, 357-
62 (1974); Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10
[Vol. 49
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tion in defining design defects: the consumer expectation test and the Wade-
Keeton reasonable manufacturer test. The former test limits recovery to situa-
tions in which the product fails to meet the safety expectations of the ordinary
consumer.13 The latter test limits recovery to situations in which a reasonable
manufacturer, knowing of the danger, would not have placed the product on
the market.24 This test employs a risk-utility balancing process. 25 Liability is
not mechanically imposed simply because the manufacturer had pre-sale
knowledge of some hazard in the product's design. Rather, the balancing pro-
cess allows the factfinder to impose liability only if its risk-utility calculation
reaches a result opposite from the manufacturer's original risk-utility
calculation.2"
Cum. L. REv. 293, 300-16 (1979); Wade, supra note 12, at 557-75.
23. The consumer expectation test was drawn from section 402A, comment i,
which discussed the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification: "The article sold must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary con-
sumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to
its characteristics." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). The
test was rooted in liability for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. Con-
cepts such as "loss of the bargain" were transposed to the product safety expectations
of the purchaser. Wade, supra note 12, at 555.
24. The reasonable manufacturer test was derived from tort law rather than
contract law and assumes the element of scienter-knowledge of the dangerous condi-
tion. Therefore, the plaintiff still is not required to show negligence on the part of the
defendant. Wade, supra note 12, at 556. Some courts have adopted a dual test, apply-
ing both the consumer expectation test and reasonable manufacturer test to the unrea-
sonably dangerous standard. E.g., Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254
(5th Cir. 1973) (applying Louisiana law).
25. Dean Wade lists seven factors to be considered:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to main-
tain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use
of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the prod-
uct and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious
condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or
instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss
by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38
(1973).
26. Schwartz, Foreward: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV.
435, 464 n.180 (1979). The difference in the risk-utility calculations lies in the fact
that a "manufacturer is concerned with a different trade-off in the cost/benefit analysis
than is an injured person." 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, §
19841
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In 1978, the California Supreme Court announced a two-part test in
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 7 which paved the way for an onslaught of
handgun litigation z.2 The case is important to anti-handgun plaintiffs for sev-
eral reasons. First, the court made clear that satisfaction of the consumer ex-
pectation test was not enough to exonerate a defendant from liability.2 Even
though a reasonable consumer would know that a handgun could be used as a
murder weapon, this would not relieve a handgun manufacturer from liabil-
ity.2 0 Second, the court in an alternative holding provided that a risk-utility
standard would apply in defining a products liability cause of action for a de-
sign defect.3 1 Third, the jury weighs the relevant factors in evaluating the ade-
quacy of a product's design.3 2 This task is generally reserved for the court in
16A[4] [f] [iv]. Because profit represents benefit, a manufacturer may conclude that
though a risk may be grave, the likelihood of the risk occurring is sufficiently small that
it does not warrant the additional expense of an alternative design. Id.
27. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). The test
provided:
First, a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff establishes
that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. Second, a
product may alternatively be found defective in design if the plaintiff demon-
strates that the product's design proximately caused his injury and the defen-
dant fails to establish, in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the
benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such
design.
Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
28. E.g., Brady v. Hinckley, No. 82-0549 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 8, 1982) (dis-
cussed in Note, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims of Handgun Crime: A Common-
Law Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 777 & nn.1-3 (1983)) (President's press
secretary shot and seriously injured in assassination attempt); Kelley v. R.G. Indus.,
No. 60-323 (Montgomery County Cir. Ct., Md., filed Mar. 15, 1982) (discussed in
Nat'l L.J., Apr. 5, 1982, at 4, col. 3) (store owner shot during hold-up attempt); Rior-
dan v. Interarms Ltd., No. 81-L-27,923 (Cook County Cir. Ct., Ill., filed Dec., 1981)
(discussed in Nat'l L.J., Dec. 21, 1981, at 30, col. 2) (former deputy police super-
intendant shot and killed while attempting to escort unruly patron from restaurant).
Windle Turley, attorney for plaintiff Judie Richman, predicted that 200 similar law-
suits will be filed against gun manufacturers by the end of 1984. Suits Target Hand-
gun Makers, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2, 1982, at 42.
29. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
30. See Birnbaum, supra note 22, at 604-05; see also infra text accompanying
notes 53-54. As an alternative, liability could be imposed under a risk-utility analysis.
See supra note 27.
31. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38;
see Birnbaum, supra note 22, at 610.
32. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. Factors that a
jury may consider include: (1) the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged de-
sign, (2) the likelihood that such danger would occur, (3) the mechanical feasibility of
a safer alternative design, (4) the financial cost of an improved design, and (5) the
adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from an
alternative design. Id.; see also Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 109,
450 N.E.2d 204, 208-09, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402-03 (1983) (jury may consider several
factors in balancing risk inherent in product, as designed, against its utility and cost).
5
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determining whether the case should be submitted to the jury.33 Fourth, under
the Barker risk-utility balancing test, the plaintiff was given a tactical advan-
tage in that the defendant has the burden of proving that the product is not
defective once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the product's
design proximately caused the injury.34
Ultimately, anti-handgun litigation advocates contend that Barker re-
quires a jury to determine "whether the handgun design presents hazards and
costs to society in excess of any socially acceptable utility of its design." 35
Since there is no serious utility in these handguns, the product is defective
because the risk of harm outweighs the utility of indiscriminately marketing
this kind of handgun for sale to the general public. 6
In Louisiana, the first element37 that a plaintiff must prove in a products
liability suit is "that the product was defective, i.e., unreasonably dangerous to
normal use."38 The defect must be one of design, composition, manufacture,39
or inadequate warning."0 The Richman court employed a two-pronged analy-
s
ij41 to determine whether the handgun used to kill Kathy Newman was defec-
tive. It first determined that the handgun was in normal use when Watson
pulled the trigger.4 2 Relying on Bennet v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co.,43 Char-
ter Arms argued that criminal use was neither a normal nor foreseeable use.
44
The court rejected this argument, citing LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
33. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 501, 525 P.2d 1033,
1040 (1974) (factors are not the basis for instruction to a jury).
34. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
35. Turley, supra note 11, at 50; see supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
36. Turley, supra note 11, at 59-62; see also Podgers, supra note 3, at 7; Weiss,
supra note 3, at 10.
37. In Hunt v. City Stores, 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980), the Louisiana Supreme
Court set out four elements that a plaintiff must prove in a products liability suit:
(1) that the product was defective; (2) that the product was in normal use at the time
the injury occurred; (3) that the defect caused the injury; and (4) that the injury
might reasonably have been anticipated by the manufacturer. Id. at 589.
38. Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 603, 250 So. 2d 754,
755 (1971). Though Louisiana courts have not expressly adopted the language of sec-
tion 402A, their decisions agree with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. Welch v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Richman, 571 F.
Supp. at 195 n.4.
39. See Weber, 259 La. at 602, 250 So. 2d at 755.
40. See LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir.
1980).
41. See Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1974) ("In order to
establish defectiveness, the plaintiff must show that the product was in normal use and
that the product was unreasonably dangerous in that use.").
42. 571 F. Supp. at 197.
43. 353 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (firearms dealer has no duty to
anticipate criminal misuse of nondefective pistol). Charter Arms also relied on Robin-
son v. Howard Bros., 372 So. 2d 1074, 1076 (Miss. 1979) (gun dealer who sold pistol
and ammunition to minor not liable for criminal acts of minor).
44. 571 F. Supp. at 196.
1984]
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Co. 45 In that case, the plaintiffs were injured in an automobile accident when
the tire tread separated. The plaintiff driver was highly intoxicated and driving
over 100 miles per hour at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the driver's illegal use of the car was a normal use,
stating that 'normal use' encompasses all reasonably foreseeable uses of a
product. 46 If car manufacturers must reasonably anticipate that purchasers of
their product will speed, the court analogized, then handgun manufacturers
must also expect that their products will be used to kill.47
Concluding that the handgun was in normal use, the Richman court then
discussed whether marketing handguns for sale to the general public was un-
reasonably dangerous. Richman cited Hunt v. City Stores" to define "unrea-
sonably dangerous." In Hunt, the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated that a
balancing test was used to determine whether a product is unreasonably dan-
gerous.49 The Richman court stated, however, that a product is unreasonably
dangerous under Louisiana law "when a reasonable seller would not sell the
product if he knew of the risks involved or if the risks are greater than a
reasonable buyer would expect.
50
The court held that Richman could not show that marketing handguns
was unreasonably dangerous. Richman's reliance on the "reasonable seller"
theory was misplaced. 51 The Louisiana legislature's failure to enact a statute
45. 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980).
46. Id. at 987-89. The court noted that operating a car "in excess of 100 miles
per hour was not 'normal' in the sense of being a routine or intended use." The term
"normal use," however, was intended not as a literal term of speech, but as a term of
art which delineates the scope of a manufacturer's duty and consequent liability. Id. at
989.
47. 571 Supp. at 197. The Richman court may have misapplied Louisiana law
regarding the "normal use" of the product. The Louisiana Supreme Court had stated
that a "manufacturer of a product which involves a risk of injury to the user is liable to
any person, whether the purchaser or a third person. . . . However, the plaintiff claim-
ing injury has the burden of proving that the product was defective, i.e., unreasonably
dangerous to normal use. . . ." Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 259 La. 599,
602-03, 250 So. 2d 754, 755 (1971). "Normal use," as used in Weber, refers to the use
of the product by the injured party. Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82, 87 (5th Cir.
1974). In Richman, Willie Watson, and not Kathy Newman, had used the handgun.
48. 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980); see also 571 F. Supp. at 195.
49. "[I]f the likelihood and gravity of harm outweigh the benefits and utility of
the manufactured product, the product is unreasonably dangerous." Hunt, 387 So. 2d
at 589. The Hunt court cited Weber, which stated that "the manufacturer is presumed
to know of the vices in the things he makes, whether or not he has actual knowledge of
them." Id. (quoting Weber, 259 La. at 603, 250 So. 2d at 756).
50. 571 F. Supp. at 195 (quoting Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d
252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973)); see also Bridges v. Chemrex Specialty Coatings, Inc., 704
F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983) ("basic test is whether a reasonable seller would not sell
the product if the risks involved were known or if the risks were greater than a reasona-
ble buyer would expect"); DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co,, 403 So. 2d 26,
30-31 (La. 1981) (consumer expectation approach particularly appropriate in
Louisiana).
51. 571 F. Supp. at 198.
[Vol. 49
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banning the sale of handguns or to amend the state constitution to that effect
implied that most legislators do not think that marketing handguns to the pub-
lic was an unreasonably dangerous activity.
52
The court also held that Richman failed under the "consumer expecta-
tion" theory.5 3 The risks involved in marketing handguns are not greater than
reasonable consumers expect. "Every reasonable consumer that purchases a
handgun doubtless knows that the product can be used as a murder
weapon." 54 Because marketing handguns to the public is not unreasonably
dangerous, Richman as a matter of law could not prove that the handgun was
defective. 55 There was thus no basis for recovery under Louisiana products
liability law.
The court next examined the plaintiff's alternate theory that marketing
handguns for sale to the general public is an ultrahazardous activity. Signifi-
cantly, the court used the terms "ultrahazardous" and "abnormally danger-
ous" interchangeably in its analysis.56 Like strict products liability, ul-
52. Id. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts re-
lied on the Richman court's reasoning when it dismissed a wrongful death action
brought against a gun manufacturer. In that case, the decedent, an innocent bystander,
was struck by a bullet from an automatic pistol. Mavilia v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F.
Supp. 107, 108, 110 (D. Mass. 1983). The court stated:
The legislature has on numerous occasions in the past ten years considered
banning handguns and has consistently rejected the proposals. It has enacted
comprehensive licensing provisions for suppliers and purchasers . . . indicat-
ing its disinclination toward banning handguns. . . .Thus the clear inference
is that the majority of legislators in Massachusetts also do not feel that the
marketing of handguns to the public is an unreasonably dangerous activity or
socially unacceptable.
Id. at I 11. The legislature's failure to ban handguns does not necessarily equate with a
court's refusal to impose liability on a handgun manufacturer. Even if liabilty were
imposed, manufacturers could still make and market handguns. See 571 F. Supp. at
198 n.9. The fallacy of this argument lies in the assumption that legislative inaction is
a dependable indicator of legislative intent or public policy. Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del.
Ch. 222, 234, 222 A.2d 800, 807 (1966).
53. 571 F. Supp. at 197.
54. Id. One commentator has proposed that a handgun that causes injury to a
human being "'has failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would ex-
pect.'" Fisher, supra note 11, at 17. The argument is not persuasive because it over-
looks the obvious hazards that a handgun poses. See Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in
Products Liability Law-A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REv. 579, 589
(1980). However, the consumer expectation test fails to consider the relationship of the
product to the victim murdered by the handgun. The test also abbreviates the analytic
process by ignoring risk-utility factors. Birnbaum, supra note 22, at 613; see also supra
notes 25-26, 32 and accompanying text.
55. 571 F. Supp. at 195.
56. See 571 F. Supp. at 200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977)
uses the term "abnormally dangerous" rather than "ultrahazardous." RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 520 (1938) defined ultrahazardous activity as follows: "An activity is ul-
trahazardous if it (a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or
chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and
(b) is not a matter of common usage." The American Law Institute significantly re-
1984]
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trahazardous activity liability is imposed without a finding of negligence.
Additionally, a balancing process is used for determining liability.51 However,
liability for an ultrahazardous activity is absolute. 8 In other words, the activ-
ity, because of its social value, is not stigmatized as negligent. It simply is
required to pay its own way. 59 This virtually makes the enterpriser an insurer.
Once it is determined that the enterpriser's activity is ultrahazardous, the in-
jured party recovers by showing that the enterpriser caused the damage.60
However, the rule of absolute liability applies only to the kind of harm within
the scope of the risk that makes the activity ultrahazardous. In other words,
liability does not extend to every possible harm that may result from carrying
on the ultrahazardous activity.6
1
The absolute liability for an ultrahazardous activity differs in two other
ways from strict products liability. First, an ultrahazardous activity is one in
which the potential harm is an unavoidable risk, even though the enterpriser
exercises the utmost care in preventing the harm.6 2 Second, the court, and not
the jury, determines whether the activity is ultrahazardous. This is because the
factors involved raise policy issues that courts are unwilling to entrust to
juries.13
The Richman court relied on sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts 4 in deciding that marketing handguns to the general public
shaped the ultrahazardous activity concept in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.
See infra note 64. Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1938) with RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1977). The Richman court clearly relied
on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS in its ultrahazardous activity analysis. See
571 F. Supp. at 200.
57. Wade, supra note 25, at 835. The factors to be weighed are listed in RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). See infra note 64.
58. Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 498 (La. 1982).
59. Wade, supra note 25, at 836.
60. Kent, 418 So. 2d at 498.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(2) & comment e (1977); see, e.g.,
Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash. 2d 440, 445, 268 P.2d 645, 648 (1954) (risk that
vibrations or noise may frighten mink and cause them to kill their young does not make
blasting an ultrahazardous activity).
62. Kent, 418 So. 2d at 498; see also Wade, supra note 25, at 836.
63. Wade, supra note 25, at 836. The Richman court appears noncommittal on
this issue: "Whether the decision about how to classify the defendant's activities is for
the Court or a jury to make is an issue to be resolved at some future date." 571 F.
Supp. at 204 n.14. Comment I to section 520 provides: "[lit is no part of the province
of the jury to decide whether an industrial enterprise upon which the community's
prosperity might depend is located in the wrong place or whether such an activity as
blasting is to be permitted without liability in the center of a large city." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment 1 (1977). Following these provisions, the court
would have to decide at trial whether Charter Arms' marketing practices were
ultrahazardous.
64. Section 519 sets out the general principle underlying the liability of one who
carries on an abnormally dangerous activity:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to
liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the
[Vol. 49
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may be an ultrahazardous activity.6" The court then examined the factors set
out in section 520 and determined that the defendant's marketing practices
were not exempt from being classified as ultrahazardous. 66 Factors (a) and (b)
consider whether the activity creates a high degree of risk of harm to a person
and whether the likelihood of the harm resulting will be great.6 7 The court
found merit in Richman's argument that the harm threatened by Charter
Arms' marketing practices-serious physical injury and death-was "major in
degree" and "sufficiently great."68
Likewise, the court found merit in Richman's argument concerning factor
(c), which considers the defendant's inability to eliminate the risk by exercis-
ing reasonable care. 69 Richman contended that so long as Charter Arms con-
tinues marketing handguns to the general public, no amount of due care will
significantly reduce the risk of harm.7 0 The court next concluded that the op-
activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibilty of
which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). The factors to be weighed in deter-
mining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous are listed in section 520:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dan-
gerous attributes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
65. The court manipulated a footnote in Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258
La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971) to maneuver into the Restatement provisions. The
Langlois court stated that "states under common law have recognized that, in ultra-
hazardous activities such as this, liability is imposed in the absence of negligence." Id.
at 1083 n.13, 249 So. 2d at 139 n.13. It then cited sections 519 and 520 and other
authorities for this proposition. This footnote actually precedes the rule for ul-
trahazardous activities articulated in Langlois and referred to by the Richman court.
See 258 La. at 1083-84, 249 So. 2d at 140; see also 571 F. Supp. at 199-200.
66. 571 F. Supp. at 200-02, 204.
67. See supra note 64.
68. 571 F. Supp. at 201. The court relied on RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 520 comment g (1977): "The harm threatened must be major in degree, and suffi-
ciently serious in its possible consequences. . . . If the potential harm is sufficiently
great. . . the likelihood that it will take place may be comparatively slight ... "" Id.
69. 571 F. Supp. at 201.
70. Id. The court found the discussion in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
520 comment h (1977) illuminating:
What is referred to here is the unavoidable risk remaining in the activity,
even though the actor has taken all reasonable precautions in advance and has
exercised all reasonable care in his operation, so that he is not negligent. The
utility of his conduct may be such that he is socially justified in proceeding
with his activity, but the unavoidable risk of harm that is inherent in it re-
19841
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eration of handguns is not a matter of common usage under factor (d).7 1 Un-
like operating an automobile, consuming liquor, or using a knife-activities
which are potentially dangerous-handgun use is not "'customarily carried on
by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community.' "72
Factor (e) considers the inappropriateness of the activity to the place
where it is carried on.73 The court stated that Richman's claim that there is no
place in the United States where handguns can be safely marketed for sale to
the general public may or may not be true. Furthermore, the court could not
say that the claim was "immaterial or that no genuine dispute about it
exists."74
Finally, factor (f) considers the extent to which the value of the activity
to the community outweighs its dangerous attributes. 75 Richman's argument
that marketing handguns for sale to the general public has no utility at all was
exaggerated. 7 The court stated that Charter Arms' marketing activities pro-
duce jobs and provide a measure of self-defense to people who buy handguns.
Moreover, in failing to ban handgun sales to the general public, the legislature
has indicated that Charter Arms' marketing practices have social utility.7
However, the court could not conclude that "'the community is largely de-
voted to the [defendant's] dangerous enterprise and [that the community's]
prosperity largely depends upon it.' "78
The next step of the court's analysis was determining whether Willie
Watson's willful act of murdering Kathy Newman relieved Charter Arms
from absolute liability. Charter Arms contended that it was exonerated from
liability because Willie Watson, and not the company, caused her death.79 In
essence, this defense required the court to address the problematic issue of
whether marketing handguns to the general public was the proximate cause of
Kathy Newman's death.
Under Louisiana law, no defendant can be held strictly liable for injuries
quires that it be carried on at his peril, rather than at the expense of the
innocent person who suffers harm as a result of it.
71. 571 F. Supp. at 202.
72. Id. at 201-02 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment i
(1977)). People are likely to use a handgun only in highly unusual circumstances. For
instance, they may be attacking a criminal assailant or acting as a criminal assailant.
Id. at 202.
73. See supra note 64.
74. 571 F. Supp. at 202. The court noted that the locality factor normally per-
tains to activities such as blasting with explosives, crop dusting, and transporting highly
inflammable liquids. These activities usually are deemed to be ultrahazardous if they
are conducted in densely populated areas. If conducted in a desert, they are not. There-
fore, the location of the activity is critical. Id.
75. See supra note 64.
76. 571 F. Supp. at 202.
77. Id.; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
78. 571 F. Supp. at 202 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520
comment k (1977)).
79. 571 F. Supp. at 204-05.
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caused by the fault of the victim, the fault of a third person, or an irresistable
force.80 Since a third person, Willie Watson, was at fault, the court turned to
Olsen v. Shell Oil Co.,81 in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
proof that a third person is the "sole cause of the damage" relieves a defen-
dant from liability.82 The Richman court embarked on a lengthy and confus-
ing analysis of the "sole cause" rule as set forth in Olsen.83 Based on its analy-
80. See Jones v. City of Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d 737, 740 (La. 1980).
81. 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978).
82. Id. at 1293. The Olsen court did refer to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 440-453 (1965) in formulating the rule. See 365 So. 2d at 1293 n.15; see
also infra note 83.
83. The court commenced its analysis by pointing out that subsequent Louisi-
ana appellate court and Fifth Circuit opinions have given Olsen both narrow and broad
interpretations. 571 F. Supp. at 205. Those courts reading Olsen narrowly say that
under the "sole cause" rule a defendant can exonerate himself from liability by proving
that the third person was a stranger, someone who acted without the defendant's con-
sent. Id. (citing Hyde v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 697 F.2d 614, 620 (5th Cir. 1983);
Brown v. Soupenne, 416 So. 2d 170, 173 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Robertson v. Parish of
E. Baton Rouge, 415 So. 2d 365, 367 (La. Ct. App. 1982)).
The court may have misread a narrow interpretation into these cases. In both Rob-
ertson and Brown, the Louisiana Courts of Appeals discussed the stranger qualification
only in a factual context where the third person was not a stranger. Since it was deter-
mined that the stranger qualification was not satisfied, the courts were not compelled to
discuss the scope of the "sole cause" rule articulated in Olsen. See Robertson, 415 So.
2d at 368; Brown, 416 So. 2d at 173. In Hyde, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit stated that one is absolved from liability by "the fault of some third
party (who must be a 'stranger' rather than a person acting with the consent of the
owner)." Hyde, 697 F.2d at 620. The court's statement merely qualifies "third party"
and does not necessarily limit the scope of the "sole cause" rule.
It would be easy for Charter Arms to show that Willie Watson was a stranger.
571 F. Supp. at 206. The court, however, elected to follow the broad interpretation,
relying on Ramos v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1112 (1981), for a broad reading of Olsen. Ramos stated: "When the 'third
person' is a stranger, not one acting with the owner's consent, the owner cannot avoid
[Louisiana Civil Code article] 2322 liability." Id. at 342. Thus, the mere fact that the
third person was a stranger does not preclude liability. The court gave three reasons for
following the broad interpretation. First, it looked to the language used by the Olsen
court. In Olsen the court stated:
The fault of a "third person" which exonerates . . . is that which is the sole
cause of the damage, of the nature of an irresistible and unforeseen occur-
rence-i.e. where the damage resulting has no causal relationship whatsoever
to the fault of the owner . . . and where the "third person" is a stranger
rather than a person acting with the consent of the owner.
Olsen, 365 So. 2d at 1293. A broad reading of Olsen indicates that Charter Arms
would have to show both that Willie Watson was a stranger and that the risk of harm
it created by marketing handguns for sale to the general public did not contribute to
Kathy Newman's death. 571 F. Supp. at 206.
Second, a broad interpretation of Olsen was appropriate because the Louisiana
Supreme Court noted in Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982),
that no Louisiana decision has placed any activities in which a third person contributed
to causing the damages in the ultrahazardous category. Id. at 499 n.8. The Richman
court indicated that Kent made no distinction between strangers and other persons.
1984]
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sis, the court stated that Charter Arms would have to show both that Willie
Watson was a stranger and that the risk of harm it created by marketing
handguns for sale to the general public did not contribute to Kathy Newman's
death.84
Charter Arms could readily satisfy the "stranger" prong of the sole cause
test.8 5 Relying on dicta80 from Olsen, however, the court ultimately concluded
Furthermore, it concluded that Kent left ultrahazardous activity law unsettled as to a
defendant's liability for damages caused by third-person strangers. 571 F. Supp. at
206. By the same token, the Kent court may have been indicating that Louisiana law
governing ultrahazardous activities exempted those activities when a third person could
"reasonably be expected to be a contributing factor in the causation of damages with
any degree of frequency." 418 So. 2d at 499 n.8. In Kent, the Louisiana Supreme
Court refused to find that transmitting electricity over isolated high tension power lines
was an ultrahazardous activity. Injury resulting from transmitting electricity was al-
most always due to substandard conduct of the utility, the victim, or a third party, Id.
at 498-99.
Finally, the court emphasized that the Olsen court based the third-person defense
on §§ 440-453 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, which also draw no distinc-
tions between strangers and other persons. 571 F. Supp. at 206. Those sections relevant
to the case at bar are § 440, which defines superseding cause, and § 448, which deals
with criminal acts done under an opportunity afforded by the defendant's negligence.
Section 440 provides: "A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force
which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another
which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965). Section 448 provides:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a su-
perseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's
negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the
third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his
negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a
situation might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the
opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.
Id. § 448. The court acknowledged that these sections discuss superseding cause only as
it relates to a defendant's negligence. Further, it stated that these sections prescribe
that a negligent defendant is liable only when an intervening act by a third person is
foreseeable. 571 F. Supp. at 206-07.
By contrast, Olsen was a strict liability case. Olsen stated, however, that the same
rule applies in both negligence and strict liability cases. 571 F. Supp. at 207. The Olsen
court stated:
[T]he owner . . . of a defective . . . thing . . . is not relieved of ...
strict liability to a victim injured thereby by the circumstance that the fault
or negligence of a third person contributing to the injury, unless the interven-
ing third person's act or fault is in the nature of a superseding cause in An-
glo-American tort law. See Restatement of Torts, 2d, Sections 440-453
(1965).
365 So. 2d at 1293 n.15. Because the facts in Olsen did not require that court to
discuss or expand the scope of section 448, and because Olsen cited no authority in
support of its claim, the Richman court concluded that Olsen's claim was dicta. Never-
theless, the court followed the dicta. 571 F. Supp. at 207.
84. 571 F. Supp. at 206; see also supra note 83.
85. 571 F. Supp. at 206; see also supra note 83.
86. 571 F. Supp. at 207; see also supra note 83.
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that the second prong presented a jury question.8 7 In other words, it was now
up to a jury to decide whether Charter Arms' marketing practices had
"'something to do with the harm' "88 or were "'a substantial factor contribut-
ing to the . . . injury.' "89
The court stated that the critical question in this motion for summary
judgment was "not whether Willie Watson's conduct was the sole cause or a
superseding cause of Kathy Newman's death."9 The court phrased what it
considered to be the critical issue in the following question: "What are the
legal limits of a handgun manufacturer's liability for the criminal acts of third
persons?"'" The answer to this question is derived from Louisiana products
liability and ultrahazardous activity law. A close examination of both areas of
the law thus led the court to hold that Judy Richman could proceed with her
claim only under the ultrahazardous activity theory. 92
There are several problems with the court's holding and reasoning. There
are inherent problems with a plaintiff proceeding under sections 519 and 520
of the Restatement. First, absolute liability is imposed under these sections
because the activity is deemed to have social utility.9 3 Yet anti-handgun plain-
tiffs insist that there is no social value in marketing handguns to the general
public.94 A plaintiff is seeking recovery under a theory which, by its very na-
ture, negates the plaintiff's contention that handguns have no utility when
marketed to the public.
Second, though the court weighs all of the factors in section 520 to deter-
mine whether a given activity is ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous, the
comments consistently stress the importance of locality.95 Cases under section
87. 571 F. Supp. at 207.
88. Id. (quoting Jones v. Robbins, 289 So. 2d 104, 106 (La. 1974); Hill v. Lun-
din & Assocs., 260 La. 542, 547, 256 So. 2d 620, 622 (1972)).
89. 571 F. Supp. at 207 (quoting Frank v. Pitre, 353 So. 2d 1293, 1296 (La.
1977) (Tate, J. concurring); Taylor v. State, 431 So. 2d 876, 879 (La Ct. App. 1983)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 208.
92. Id.
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment b (1977): The "ac-
tivity. . . is of such utility that the risk which is involved in it cannot be regarded as so
great or so unreasonable as to make it negligence merely to carry on the activity at
all." Id.
94. 571 F. Supp. at 202. They concede that a handgun has social utility with
respect to law enforcement functions. Suits Target Handgun Makers, NEWSWEEK, Au-
gust 2, 1982, at 42. However, marketing handguns to law enforcement agencies is not
an activity at issue in handgun litigation.
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977) and the following
comments:
c. Relation to nuisance. . . . The rule of strict liability stated in § 519
frequently is applied. . . under the name of "absolute nuisance," even when
the harm that results is physical harm to person, land or chattels.
e. Not limited to the defendant's land. In most of the cases . . . the
abnormally dangerous activity is conducted on land in the possession of the
1984]
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519 emphasize the dangers and inappropriateness of the activity in relation to
the locality in which it is carried on."6 No cases have extended liability to an
activity deemed to be inappropriate in all localities.
Admittedly, this may not be the most persuasive argument upon which a
defendant might rely in attacking a theory of recovery based on sections 519
and 520 of the Restatement. There is no outright requirement that the activity
be inappropriate to the place where it is carried on. The factor is only one of
six to be considered and weighed under section 520.97 However, ul-
trahazardous case law in any given jurisdiction may emphasize the locality
defendant. This, again, is not necessary to the existence of such an activity. It
may be carried on in a public highway or other public place or upon the land
of another.
f. "Abnormally dangerous". ... In other words, are its dangers and
inappropriateness for the locality so great that, despite any usefulness it may
have for the community, it should be required as a matter of law to pay for
any harm it causes, without the need of a finding of negligence.
g. Risk of harm . . . . In determining whether there is such a major
risk, it may therefore be necessary to take into account the place where the
activity is conducted ....
h. Risk not eliminated by reasonable care. . . . There is probably no
activity . . . from which all risks of harm could not be eliminated by . . . the
exercise of the utmost care, particularly as to the place where it is carried on.
j. Locality . . . . [T]he fact that the activity is inappropriate to the
place where it is carried on is . . . sometimes expressed . . . by saying there
is strict liability for a "non-natural" use of the defendant's land.
k. Value to the community. . . . There is an analogy here to the con-
sideration of the same elements in determining the existence of a nuisance
96. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs app. § 519 reporter's note (1981).
Abnormally dangerous activities are categorized as follows: (1) water collected in
quantity in unsuitable or dangerous place; (2) explosives in quantity in a dangerous
place; (3) inflammable liquids in quantity in the midst of a city; (4) blasting in the
midst of a city; (5) pile driving with abnormal risks to surroundings; (6) release into
air of poisonous gas or dust; and (7) drilling oil wells or operating refineries in thickly
settled communities. Id. In Richman, the plaintiff contended that "there is no place in
the United States where handguns can be safely marketed for sale to the general pub-
lic." 571 F. Supp. at 202. The doctrine of strict liability for ultrahazardous activity
developed from the leading English case of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330
(1868). The rule that emerged from Rylands was that a "defendant will be liable when
he damages another by a thing or activity unduly dangerous and inappropriate to the
place where it is maintained, in the light of the character of that place and its sur-
roundings." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 78, at 547-48 (5th ed. 1984). American courts have applied the Rylands prin-
ciple only to activities that are out of place-the abnormally dangerous condition or
activity which is not a natural one where it is. Id. at 549-51. Prosser emphasized that
American cases generally have stressed the place where the activity is carried on. Fur-
thermore, American courts have applied the Rylands principle under the cloak of an
absolute nuisance theory. Id. at 551-52.
97. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 96, § 78, at 555.
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factor. 98 For example, Louisiana courts have held that blasting near residential
areas,9 9 pile driving with risk to neighboring property,100 and crop dusting in
proximity to another's land' 0 ' are ultrahazardous activities. Handgun manu-
facturer defendants might argue that the locality factor is thereby one of the
most important factors for a court to weigh when it applies the ultrahazardous
concept to the facts as found by the jury. In summary, extending liability to
an activity deemed to be inappropriate in all localities is contrary to case law.
A more basic flaw in Richman is that the court violated the holding in
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.' Under Erie, state substantive law is to be fol-
lowed by a federal court in diversity cases.' 03 Louisiana courts have found
ultrahazardous activities to include pile driving, storage of toxic gas, blasting
with explosives, and crop dusting. 04 The Louisiana Supreme Court has re-
viewed and interpreted the law regarding ultrahazardous activities on four sep-
arate occasions.' 05 None of these decisions suggest that the Louisiana Supreme
Court would agree with the holding and analysis in Richman. The court disre-
garded Erie by relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an approach the
Louisiana Supreme Court has never taken. 10 6
98. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
99. E.g., Roshong v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 785, 786-88 (La. Ct. App.
1973).
100. E.g., Selle v. Kleamenakis, 142 So. 2d 50, 50-51 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
101. E.g., Romero v. Chris Crusta Flying Serv., 140 So. 2d 734, 735-36 (La. Ct.
App. 1962).
102. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
103. Id. at 78.
104. Kent, 418 So. 2d at 498 n.7.
105. See id.
106. In imposing liability for ultrahazardous activities, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has relied on Civil Code Articles 2315, 667 and 669. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art.
2315 (West Supp. 1984) provides in relevant part: "Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." LA.
CiV. CODE ANN. art. 667 (West 1980) deals with limitations on the use of property
and provides: "Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still
he can not make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of
enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him." LA. CiV. CODE
ANN. art. 669 (West 1980) deals with regulation of inconvenience and provides:
If the works or materials for any manufactory or other operation, cause an
inconvenience to those in the same or in the neighboring houses, by diffusing
smoke or nauseous smell, and there be no servitude established by which they
are regulated, their sufferance must be determined by the rules of the police,
or the customs of the place.
The Richman court stated that it had no reason to suspect that its analysis was incom-
patible with Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971). 571
F. Supp. at 204. In Langlois, the Louisiana Supreme Court articulated the following
rule regarding ultrahazardous activities:
We do not here establish a new standard for liability, but merely apply the
standard set by law and applied repeatedly in our jurisprudence. The activi-
ties of man for which he may be liable without acting negligently are to be
determined after a study of the law and customs, a balancing of claims and
1984]
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There are other Erie problems with the court's holding. In every case
where the Louisiana Supreme Court has found an activity to be ul-
trahazardous, liability was imposed on the parties using the item or on land-
owners authorizing the use of the item that made the activity ul-
trahazardous. 10 7 These cases suggest that a product must be joined with a
particular use of the product before any ultrahazardous activity is created.10 8
Handguns, like explosives and deadly gases, are subject to a variety of uses,
and the magnitude of risk occasioned by a handgun significantly depends on
which use its owner selects. Whether based on policy considerations of fairness
or accident prevention, liability should remain with the entity or individual
utilizing the handgun rather than be shifted back to the gun manufacturer.10,
In Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc.,110 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declined to follow the Richman court's lead
in creating such a cause of action. The Martin court's primary misgiving with
Richman was that Charter Arms' potential liability under an ultrahazardous
activity theory was grounded in the sale, rather than the use, of the hand-
interests, a weighing of the risk and the gravity of harm, and a consideration
of individual and societal rights and obligations.
258 La. at 1083-84, 249 So. 2d at 140. The Richman court characterized the rule as
vague and immediately moved into the Restatement provisions. 571 F. Supp. at 200;
see supra note 65. Though the factors enumerated in Langlois are similar to those in
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, the Richman court did not reconcile its
analysis with the statement in Langlois that there was "sound jurisprudential authority
that liability for dangerous and hazardous activities . . . flows from Civil Code Article
2315 by analogy with other Civil Code Articles." 258 La. at 1081, 239 So. 2d at 139.
In other words, it is by analogy with Articles 667 and 669 that Article 2315 is applica-
ble to ultrahazardous activities. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework
of Vicinage: Articles 667-69 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 48 TULANE L. REV. 195, 225
(1974). Langlois expanded the concept of fault under Article 2315 to include responsi-
bility for ultrahazardous activities, namely responsibility based on the notion of risk.
Id. at 222-23. See also 258 La. at 1081-82 & nn.11-12, 239 So. 2d at 137-39 & nn.11-
12. Louisiana decisions have restricted Article 2315 liability for ultrahazardous activi-
ties to conduct which falls within the framework of Articles 667 and 669. See e.g., 258
La. at 1084, 239 So. 2d at 140 (defendant injured plaintiff by its fault as analogized
from conduct required under Article 669 and responsibility attached under Article
2315). In holding that marketing handguns to the general public may be an ul-
trahazardous activity, the Richman court failed to analyze how Charter Arms' liability
attaches under Article 2315 by analogy with either Articles 667 or 669, or, for that
matter, with any article in the Civil Code.
107. E.g., Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971)(chemical company storing toxic gas); Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co., 252 La. 502,
211 So. 2d 627 (1968) (company conducting pile driving during construction); Go-
treaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957) (landowner and company con-
ducting crop dusting); Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 277 La. 866, 80 So. 2d
845 (1955) (petroleum company conducting blasting operations).
108. See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 490-91.
109. See id.
110. 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984). Martin was also a diversity action against a
gun manufacturer in which plaintiffs sought damages for injuries suffered by two men
who were shot by a judgment-proof third party. Id. at 1201.
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gun.111 Emphasizing that strict liability for the sale of a product was limited to
unreasonably dangerous products, the court stated that "Illinois has never im-
posed liability upon a non-negligent manufacturer of a product that is not de-
fective.""1 2 Indeed, Illinois courts have imposed liability for engaging in ul-
trahazardous activities relating only to the use of the product. 11 3
Finally, the Richman court ignored Erie in its risk-bearer analysis. The
court justified its holding by reasoning that Charter Arms was a better risk
bearer than Willie Watson. 14 An overriding goal of imposing absolute liability
is "allocation of loss to the party better equipped to pass it on to the pub-
lic." 15 Charter Arms has a greater ability than Judie Richman to act as a risk
bearer because it can insure against risks created by its marketing practices
and pass on the cost to consumers in the form of higher prices for handguns., 6
Thus, a superior risk-bearing capacity may justify shifting loss from a plaintiff
to a defendant.11 7 The Richman court, however, distinguished the superior risk
bearer as between two defendants. Because the principal case was different
from ordinary ultrahazardous activity cases, in which the entity using the item
is likely to be a good risk bearer, the court reasoned that Richman would be
without an effective remedy if liability were not extended."' The Louisiana
Supreme Court has noted the trend toward expanding the classes from whom
recovery can be had."19 However, nothing in these cases suggests extension of
enterprise liability under Louisiana law to second generation risk-bearers such
as Charter Arms.
Though the Richman court permitted the proximate cause question to go
to the jury, courts as a matter of law are reluctant to impose liability on a
defendant when in fact a third party commits an intentional criminal act
which causes the injury." 0 The Richman court determined that, under Louisi-
ana law, liability will be imposed unless the defendant proves that the fault of
a third person is the sole cause of the damage."' The Louisiana rule differs
from the general rule of proximate cause that limits liability to the scope of
the original risk created and to foreseeable consequences."' This is the rule
111. Id. at 1203-04.
112. Id. at 1204.
113. Id.
114. 571 F. Supp. at 203 n.13.
115. Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J.
1172, 1176 (1952).
116. See 571 F. Supp. at 203.
117. Morris, supra note 115, at 1176-79.
118. 571 F. Supp. at 203 n.13.
119. Langlois, 258 La. at 1079-80, 249 So. 2d at 138. The court was referring to
the fact that ultrahazardous activity liability was not limited to the landowner who
hired the contractor but included the contractor who carried on the activity. Id.
120. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bokelman, 86 Nev. 10, 13, 462 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1970)
(when third party intentionally shot victim, plaintiff could not recover as a matter of
law).
121. 571 F. Supp. at 205; see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
122. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 96, § 43, at 281, 297.
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generally applied in cases of intervening causes."1 2 In strict liability cases,
practical necessity also dictates restricting liability within some reasonable
bounds. It is one thing to require an enterpriser to pay its way within reasona-
ble limits and quite another to require it to take responsibility for every con-
ceivable harm that its activity may cause.12 4
Within the framework of this general rule of proximate cause, courts have
consistently refused to invoke liability in cases involving intentional criminal
acts with firearms. First and foremost, courts would agree that Willie Wat-
son's criminal misuse of the handgun was not foreseeable. 25 Second, courts
123. Id. at 282.
124. Id. § 78, at 559-60.
125. See, e.g., Bennet v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co., 353 F. Supp. 1206, 1210
(E.D. Ky. 1973) (firearms dealer could not reasonably have foreseen criminal misuse of
weapon); Adkinson v. Rossi Arms Co., 659 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Alaska 1983) (manufac-
turer or distributor of firearm could not foresee that "shooter will unlawfully and inten-
tionally point the firearm and be convicted of manslaughter"); Hulsman v. Hemmeter
Dev. Corp., 65 Hawaii 58, 70, 647 P.2d 713, 721-22 (1982); (party's conduct in
purchasing weapon would not lead seller to foresee that party would criminally misuse
firearm); Robinson v. Howard Bros., 372 So. 2d 1074, 1076 (Miss. 1979) (less reason
to foresee premeditated murder as opposed to acts that are merely negligent); Thomas
v. Bokelman, 86 Nev. 10, 13, 462 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1970) (although defendants left
gun and ammunition accessible, there was no reason for defendants to foresee that ex-
felon would kill visitor with the gun).
The foreseeability debate between proponents and opponents of handgun litigation
has raged profusely. Opponents contend that the intended purpose of handguns encom-
passes hunting, trapshooting, target shooting, and self-defense. Some Americans collect
firearms, while others employ them in military, law enforcement, and private security
positions. Santarelli & Calio, Turning the Gun on Tort Law: Aiming at Courts to Take
Products Liability to the Limit, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 471, 479 (1983). They argue that
criminal misuse of a handgun, while foreseeable, breaks the chain of causation. Id. at
495. The proposition is put succinctly in the statement, "Guns don't kill people, people
kill people." Weiss, supra note 3, at 12. Conversely, proponents contend that the in-
tended purpose of handguns encompasses criminal misuse. See Turley, supra note 11,
at 58-59. Handguns rank as the second leading cause of unnatural death in the United
States. Although handguns comprise only about 30% of the firearms in public hands,
they account for 90% of firearm misuse and approximately 22,000 deaths annually. Id.
at 41-42 (citing BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS STATISTICS (1980);
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 5-21 (1981); U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 130 (1980)). Handgun misuse can be di-
vided into four categories: (1) suicide, (2) accidental shootings, (3) shootings resulting
spontaneously during arguments, and (4) homicides. In 1979, 50% of handgun deaths
resulted from suicide, whereas only 15% resulted from homicides. Accidental shootings
accounted for 6% of total handgun deaths, and the remaining 29% were a result of
spontaneous shootings. Id. at 42 (citing 2 MORTALITY STATISTICS BRANCH, Div. OF
VITAL STATISTICS, NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE
U.S., MORTALITY 35 (1980); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
12 (1979)). Though criminal misuse accounts for only 15% of handgun deaths, statis-
tics show that handguns are used in 50% of all murders, 23% of aggravated assaults,
and 40% of all robberies. In 1980, handguns were used in 220,000 robberies and
157,000 aggravated assaults. Id. at 58-59 (citing U.S, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, F.B.I. UNI-
FORM CRIME REPORTS 13, 18-21 (1980)). The frequency with which these events occur
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generally view a third party criminal act as an independent intervening cause
that insulates a defendant from liability.'26 Following this reasoning, the crim-
inal act perpetuated by Willie Watson broke any causal connection between
Charter Arms' marketing practices and Kathy Newman's death." 7 Third, a
manufacturer of a nondefective firearm has no duty to anticipate unlawful acts
or to protect against criminal conduct. 2 " Fourth, public policy prohibits shift-
ing liability from the criminal actor to the gun manufacturer. 29 For example,
the policy of preventing future harm would not be advanced by allowing civil
recovery against the gun manufacturer. To do so would effectively minimize
the criminal significance of the third party's conduct. Moreover, the degree of
"moral blame" of a gun manufacturer is less significant than that which soci-
ety attaches to the commission of a crime like that in Richman."30
In rejecting the holding in Richman, the Martin court summarized the
pervasive position adopted by the courts: criminal misuse of a handgun is an
unforeseeable, intervening cause that relieves a manufacturer of liability, and
"whether such an intervening cause exists can be determined as a matter of
law." 31 Considering all of the above factors, the great weight of authority
clearly militates against the holding of Richman.
A more basic issue to be addressed with handgun litigation is gun control.
Is Richman before a federal court merely as a wrongful death suit? Opponents
contend that plaintiffs' lawyers and proponents seek to implement gun control
through litigation."' They argue that the proposed shift in liability is a legisla-
tive matter.' 33 Present gun control laws restrict public access to firearms. Fur-
thermore, a court that allows a case such as Richman to proceed to trial ex-
ceeds the bounds of judicial restraint." 4
precludes the manufacturer from arguing that criminal misuse is not an intended pur-
pose of a handgun. Moreover, liability does not require that the manufacturer have
anticipated the chain of events leading to criminal misuse. Id. at 48-49. A limited num-
ber of cases supports this view. See, e.g., Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 147, 547
S.W.2d 91, 93 (1977) (when handgun was obtained through illegal sale, use of gun to
rob grocery store and murder two persons was foreseeable), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835
(1977); Palmisano v. Ehrig, 171 N.J. Super. 310, 313, 408 A.2d 1083, 1084 (1979)
(foreseeable that son's friend would cause a firearm to discharge through roof and in-
jure plaintiff on floor above), cert. denied, 82 N.J. 287, 412 A.2d 793 (1980).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Shively, 345 F.2d 294, 296-97 (5th Cir. 1965)
(although army personnel negligently issued pistol without authorization, sargeant's in-
dependent illegal use of gun to cause injuries was proximate cause), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 883 (1965).
127. See Adkinson v. Rossi Arms Co., 659 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Alaska 1983) (no
significant degree of closeness of connection).
128. Bennet, 353 F. Supp. at 1210; Adkinson, 659 P.2d at 1238.
129. Adkinson, 659 P.2d at 1238.
130. Id. at 1239-40.
131. Martin, 743 F.2d at 1205.
132. Santarelli & Calio, supra note 125, at 505-06.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 505.
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Proponents counter that current gun control laws are ineffective in reduc-
ing handgun violence;' 35 legislatures have sold out to the gun lobby. In addi-
tion, juries are not as easily influenced or susceptible to political pressures as
legislators. 36 Therefore, it is a proper judicial function to supplement duties
imposed by gun control statutes with those imposed by the common law. 137
In fact, proponents believe that extending tort liability theories to hand-
gun manufacturers will accomplish several goals. It will provide plaintiffs with
an untapped source of damage recovery. Public policy goals will be served by
forcing manufacturers to pay for damages caused by handguns. 138 Substantial
judgments for plaintiffs and the cost of litigation may increase insurance pre-
miums."39 This will deter sales, thus reducing handgun injuries and death.140
Plaintiffs' lawyers also hope that insurance companies will pressure gunmakers
to curtail their marketing practices severely or even eliminate the production
of "Saturday Night Specials.' 4'
That litigation proponents are using the courts to indirectly implement
handgun control is apparent.' 41 In Richman, the court addressed important
issues within the narrow confines of that case. Opponents argue that issues of
the magnitude of those raised in Richman are best resolved from the broad,
general perspective of the legislature.' 4' Furthermore, courts often inade-
quately consider the broader implications of a given decision.'4 For instance,
if Richman prevails at trial and on appeal, Charter Arms could become an
absolute insurer of marketing practices that result in handgun injuries inflicted
by a criminal third party. 45 Such judicial action would hamper general eco-
nomic growth. The cost of doing business would be passed to consumers.
Should the company be forced out of business, American workers would lose
135. Note, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims of Handgun Crime: A Common-
Law Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 773 (1983). One commentator suggests that
gun laws are constructed primarily to affect only individuals who intend to use a gun
for criminal activity. Criminal violence accounts for only 16% of total handgun deaths.
Therefore, handgun legislation addresses only a minor problem when it does not take
into account individuals owning firearms for noncriminal reasons. The effectiveness of
handgun laws largely depends upon criminal justice officials: police, prosecutors, and
judges. These officials are often reluctant to enforce the laws, press charges, or sentence
persons guilty of handgun crimes. These actions render conclusions concerning the ef-
fectiveness of gun legislation invalid. DeZee, Gun Control Legislation, 5 LAw & PoL'Y
Q. 367, 375-76 (1983).
136. See Handguns New Target for Tort Lawyers, 67 A.B.A. J. 1443, 1443
(1981).
137. Note, supra note 135, at 773.
138. Note, Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Injuries from a Well-Made
Handgun, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 467, 469-70 (1983).
139. Weiss, supra note 3, at 15.
140. Note, supra note 138, at 470.
141. Weiss, supra note 3, at 15.
142. Id. at 13.
143. Santarelli & Calio, supra note 125, at 506.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 504.
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jobs. Tax revenues would be reduced.146 At the other extreme, the company
might attempt to do business with inadequate liability insurance. Such a prac-
tice would jeopardize the "stability of the business and the legitimate rights of
claimants to compensation for harm caused by defective products."' 47
The argument is persuasive, but it does not account for the cost that rela-
tively inexpensive handguns exact of society. An estimated $500 million is
spent annually for treatment of gunshot wounds. Moreover, the annual cost to
the nation's GNP is estimated to exceed twenty billion dollars. 48 Though
these costs are not derived exclusively from the criminal misuse of handguns,
the figures illustrate the financial burden on individuals and the nation result-
ing from handgun misuse.
If anti-handgun plaintiffs are successful in the courtroom, the gun indus-
try may seek a legislative remedy to immunize itself from liability or at least
impose a ceiling on damage awards. 149 Ironically, legislatures may be called on
to solve problems created by handgun litigation instituted as an answer to
what proponents considered ineffective gun control legislation.
Though current handgun litigation based on theories proposed in Rich-
man involves criminal and accidental shootings, suicide suits may soon fol-
low.' 50 In addition, although litigants now are focusing their attack on manu-
facturers, 5 1 if decisions prove to be favorable to plaintiffs, gun dealers or even
ammunition manufacturers may find themselves subjected to suits involving
146. See id. at 504-05. Johns-Manville Corp. is a prime example of how multiple
judgments can produce detrimental effects on even a large company. The company
produced asbestos products, which were found to cause asbestosis, or lung cancer.
When plaintiffs inundated the corporation with suits, it responded by declaring Chapter
I1 bankruptcy. See Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6; see also Weiss, supra note
3, at 15.
147. Santarelli & Calio, supra note 125, at 505.
148. Turley, supra note 11, at 43; see also Ram, Geldres, & Bueno, Health Care
Costs of Gunshot Wounds, 73 OHIO ST. MED. Assoc. J. 437 (1977).
149. See Weiss, supra note 3, at 16. The Richman court points out that defen-
dants may already have a remedy of sorts in statutes of limitation. 571 F. Supp. at 203.
In Louisiana, for example, plaintiffs would be barred from recovery in wrongful death
actions if they failed to file suit within one year following the date of death. LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. art. 3492 (West Supp. 1984).
150. See Turley, supra note 11, at 55-56; see also Nat'l L.J., Dec. 12, 1983, at
15, col. 1 (wrongful death suit against gun vendor for suicide).
151. Several public policy considerations support this strategy:
(1) The manufacturer was in a peculiarly strategic position to promote safety
in his products; (2) The manufacturer was often in the dominant economic
position in the chain of production and distribution; (3) Imposing liability on
the manufacturer corresponded to the growing practice for makers to indem-
nify or insure dealers who handled their products; (4) The manufacturer
could anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as
the public could not; (5) The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health
could be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a
cost of doing business.
W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, at 11 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
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similar theories of recovery. Manufacturers also may be forced either to in-
demnify these groups or to seek contribution toward damage awards. 15'
Opponents of the proposed theories are equally concerned that partially
shifting responsibility for the consequences of a criminal act will undermine
the public interest. 153 Willie Watson should be fully accountable for his own
criminal acts. Cases like Richman may enhance the stereotype that criminals
are not held sufficiently responsible for their conduct. 54 The Richman court,
however, views this issue not so much as a question of whether society should
subsidize Willie Watson's criminal acts but rather as a question of "who has
the burden of trying to recover from Willie Watson and of bearing the loss in
the event that he cannot pay."1 5  It is still true that Willie Watson has been
convicted, and his position will not be altered substantially, if at all, by the
outcome in the case. Therefore, this argument against liability is perhaps one
of the weakest used by litigation opponents.
The Richman court struck boldly by creating a cause of action that ex-
tends liability for the criminal acts of third persons to a handgun manufac-
turer. In doing so, it responded positively to the contention that the entrance of
tort law into handgun litigation is "a normal, historically proper and abso-
lutely necessary function." '56 The court's overriding concern seemingly was
that Judie Richman should have an effective legal remedy to compensate her
for her daughter's death. 15 7 The court labored arduously to fashion Louisiana
jurisprudence into a workable medium for that remedy.
Unfortunately, the court's efforts were misplaced. It may be difficult for
the trial court to determine whether Charter Arms' marketing activities are
ultrahazardous. The underlying legal theories and policy considerations of ab-
normally dangerous/ultrahazardous activity law do not support an anti-hand-
gun plaintiff's recovery, whether viewed from the context of Louisiana law or
sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
In allowing the proximate cause question to go to the jury, the Richman
court pushed Louisiana law to its limits by relying on dicta to conclude that
Charter Arms might be responsible for Kathy Newman's death, even though
Willie Watson intentionally pulled the trigger. Convincing a judge or jury that
a gunmaker is legally responsible for the reprehensible criminal acts of an-
other person should prove to be a formidable task for any plaintiff. In most
152. See id.; see also 571 F. Supp. at 203 n.13.
153. Santarelli & Calio, supra note 125, at 507; see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 129-30.
154. Santarelli & Calio, supra note 125, at 507.
155. 571 F. Supp. at 195.
156. Podgers, supra note 3, at 40.
157. 571 F. Supp. at 203 n.13, 209. In Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc.,
743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984), the court stated that adoption of an ultrahazardous
activity theory of recovery against a gun manufacturer would effectively hold that
someone must be answerable in damages whenever someone is injured. Such a theory
was felt to be untenable and unsuited for current adoption in Illinois. Id at 1205.
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instances, a gun manufacturer's claim of superseding cause will prevail. 158
Given the brutal facts in Richman, one sympathizes with the plaintiff. To
immunize the gun industry from liability for the consequences exacted by
cheap handguns seems unjust. The net result of such immunity is a plaintiff
left without an effective remedy. However, civil liability must be based on
sound legal principle, not sympathy. The ultrahazardous activity theory is not
a viable approach for imposing liability on handgun manufacturers for the
intentional criminal acts of a third person.
JANE BRIDGEWATER
158. Note, supra note 138, at 493; see also supra text accompanying notes 120-
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